We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. Before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We demonstrate that this mitigates the winner's curse, that is, the incentive of bidders to shade their bids. It leads to more aggressive bidding, to the extent that rationing can be revenue-enhancing. In a parametric example, we characterize bid and revenue functions, and the optimal degree of rationing. We show that, when investors' information is diffuse, maximal rationing is optimal. Conversely, when their information is concentrated, the seller should not ration shares. We determine the optimal degree of rationing. Our model reconciles the documented anomaly that higher bidders in IPOs do not necessarily receive higher allocations.
Introduction
Rationing in IPOs has been extensively documented.
1 Typically, at the offer price there is excess demand, and shares are rationed to investors. All investors, both informed and uninformed are rationed. Although explanations for the rationing of uninformed investors have been offered, 2 empirically, we observe that informed investors are also rationed. This is particularly puzzling, since informed investors submit price-contingent bids. If an investor submits a bid above the offer price, why don't underwriters increase the offer price and completely fill the bids of high bidders? Empirically, they do not: informed investors who submit high bids in IPOs often do not receive the full quantity they bid for. For example, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001a) describe the bookbuilding process and examine the bids and allocations of one bookrunner in the UK. They find that informed bidders (who they describe as limit bidders) receive allocations only between 48.2% and 54.2% of their bids. Further, allocations that are received by limit bidders do not appear to depend on the level of their bid (contingent on it being higher than the offer price).
The observed rationing of informed investors is counterintuitive for two reasons. First, it contradicts the optimal IPO mechanism of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , who postulate that, amongst informed bidders, those with higher signals receive their full allocation before any shares are given to bidders with lower signals. Second, it seems to contradict profit-maximization on the part of the seller. An IPO often proceeds by a bookbuilding process, during which a demand curve is generated for the shares to be sold. 3 Yet, faced with this demand curve, the seller frequently chooses a price below the market-clearing price. Why not choose a higher price, reduce the degree of rationing, and hence increase revenue? Thus, allocations in IPO's have recently come to the forefront of policy debate.
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Is rationing direct evidence of mispricing? That is, could a seller simply choose a higher offer price and increase revenue? If the interests of the investment bank and entrepreneur differ, how much is the entrepreneur hurt by the investment banker's 1 See, for example, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001a) , and the survey paper by Ritter (1998) . 2 One argument is that the investment bank needs to reward informed investors to convince them to yield their information (see Benveniste and Spindt, 1989 , for example).
3 A survey of international IPO practices is presented in Sherman (2001) . 4 For example, see Ritter and Welch (2002) for a survey of the academic questions. The SEC has also recently expressed in this issue ("Harvey Pitt wants people to look at IPO pricing and allocations," Wall Street Journal , Aug 23, 2002 ).
ability to allocate shares? Further, when does the selective allocation of shares affect seller revenue?
In this paper, we construct a stylized version of the bookbuilding process for a common value asset. Our mechanism includes the standard auction format as a special case. Indeed, our view corresponds to that expressed by Benveniste and Busaba (1990) and Sherman (2001) , that auctions are merely a special case of bookbuilding. We consider different allocation rules the seller may use. Rationing shares at the offer price mitigates informed investors' fear of the winner's curse, and may thus increase seller revenue. We show that it can be optimal to ration, rather than choose a market-clearing price. Thus, oversubscription and rationing are not prima facie evidence that the issue price was sub-optimal, and the issuer could have raised more revenue. Further, rationing allows for discretionary allocations among investors, which may have long-term benefits for the seller. This suggests that the current debate over discretionary allocations is misplaced to the extent that seller revenue is not hurt by such allocations.
Our model has empirical implications. First, for a specific class of signals, we solve numerically for the optimal degree of rationing. Thus, within our model, we are able to characterize the observed dispersion of bids and offer prices, and relate these to the allocations. We find that the larger the range of submitted bids and also winning bids, the higher the optimal degree of rationing.
Second, since rationing can increase the proceeds of the IPO, "money left on the table" cannot be estimated by the difference between the offer price and the long-term value of the asset. The offer price is determined by the bids submitted by investors. We demonstrate that the observed demand curve depends on the mechanism offered by the seller: if investors anticipate a different allocation mechanism (in particular, a different degree of rationing), they will submit different bids. Thus, caution must be exercised in performing thought experiments of this nature on the demand curve.
The intuition that drives our results is straightforward: changing the degree of rationing potentially affects two elements of the winner's curse: the expected consumption value of the asset conditional on winning, and the price which the winner expects to pay. If informed investors are not rationed, then they only get shares when they are among the highest bidders. If they win the asset, their ex ante estimate of the value of the asset is higher than that of any bidder who did not get the asset. They take this fact into account when they bid; i.e., they reduce their bids to avoid this winner's curse. 5 By contrast, consider pro rata rationing. Under this scheme, an investor can win the asset even when many other investors have higher signals. This causes every bidder to bid higher than they would in the absence of rationing. However, if a seller increases the degree of rationing, he selects a bidder with a lower estimate of the value of the shares. The optimal degree of rationing is determined by this tradeoff. While we do not explicitly distinguish between issuers (i.e., firms going public) and underwriters, it is reasonable to suppose that their interests may diverge. 6 Indeed, NASD has recently suggested explicit prohibitions of the preferential allocation of shares to investors, provided in consideration of future business. This practice (called spinning) suggests that investment bankers do provide preferential allocations to some investors. While not all preferential allocations are necessarily bad, it is important to recognize that such discretion cannot exist unless there is oversubscription. Thus, even if rationing is sub-optimal, issuers need not be substantially damaged by these idiosyncratic allocations. This view is supported empirically by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) , who conclude that discretionary allocation does not harm issuers.
In our model, a bookrunner has k units for sale and commits to allocate them across t bidders at the (t + 1) st highest bid. In particular, t may be greater than k, in which case the seller uses an allocation rule. For example, with pro rata rationing, all winners may be allocated an amount k t
. Bidders in our model all receive signals about the value of the asset from the same distribution. They then submit sealed bids for the asset. Thus, we are considering informed bidders who submit limit bids (in particular, their bid consists of a price they are willing to pay).
Our model is, of course, a highly stylized description of an IPO process. In the U.S., an IPO is typically preceded by a "road show," during which the underwriter makes presentations to groups of buyers in various cities, and often meets with important buyers one-on-one (see, for example, Ritter, 1998) . During this road show, the lead investment banker also solicits information from the buyers on quantities they are interested in buying, and the associated prices at which they are willing to buy. In this book-building process, effectively "a demand curve is constructed" (Ritter, 1998 ). In our model, we interpret the construction of this book or demand curve as analogous to soliciting sealed bids from potential buyers. To the extent that a buyer is unaware of the price and quantity pair submitted by another buyer, this is equivalent to the simultaneous submission of sealed bids.
There are several features about the IPO process that we omit from our model. First, we fix the demand for each buyer to be a single unit. 7 Second, we consider a simultaneous game, in which bidders bid only once. With IPOs, the bookbuilding process is usually followed by the seller announcing a price at which shares will be sold. Bidders are then allowed to re-submit quantities they wish to buy at this price.
In other words, they are given a chance to revise their bids, which we do not allow in our model.
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A seminal theoretical piece on rationing, the winner's curse, and IPO underpricing is Rock (1985) . Though our model contains both rationing and a winner's curse, it is starkly different. In Rock's model, rationing is ex post (that is, occurs at the allocation stage in some states of the world), and is therefore an embodiment of the winner's curse. There are two states of the world, and rationing is evidenced only in the good state. In the bad state, there is no rationing: informed bidders reduce their demand, and uninformed bidders obtain the shares they requested. Hence, in this state, they are subject to the winner's curse.
In our model, all bidders are informed and the rationing is ex ante (that is, the seller chooses a rationing mechanism before any bids are submitted), and thus mitigates the winner's curse. Importantly, the seller commits to an equal degree of rationing in all states of the world. Ex post rationing hurts Rock's seller (it leads to lower revenue); ex ante rationing benefits the seller in our model. Thus, in Rock's model ex post rationing is the embodiment of the winner's curse and generates underpricing while in our model, ex ante rationing mitigates the winner's curse.
The distinction between ex post and ex ante rationing also distinguishes our work from Benveniste and Spindt (1989) . Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2000) demonstrate that, given a proper choice of parameters, the French mise en vente mechanism replicates the optimal Benveniste-Spindt one. In the Benveniste-Spindt framework, the underwriter presells some of the issue to informed regular investors. As an incentive 7 In multi-unit settings, Back and Zender (1993) , building on work by Wilson (1979) , show that the uniform price auction has self-enforcing collusive equilibria, leading to lower revenue than discriminatory auctions.
8 See footnote 13, however.
to reveal information, investors with good information are provided the quantity demanded by them, and are not rationed. We note that, in our model, we consider only informed bidders, and hence (unlike Benveniste and Spindt), we provide no predictions on the relative allocations between informed and uninformed bidders. As in Rock (1985) , uninformed investors are rationed when a large number of informed investors have good signals. In contrast, in our model, the degree of rationing is committed to in advance of any bids being received. Hence, this degree of rationing is constant across states of the world. While both Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and the model in this paper consider financial assets to be common value objects, a critical difference is that our investors receive correlated signals. In Benveniste and Spindt, investors have independent signals. As we show in this paper, these two different sets of assumptions have very different implications for seller's revenue.
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Our model draws upon previous work in auction theory, notably Milgrom (1981) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) . Milgrom considers an auction for a commonvalue object, where the seller has t units for sale and each buyer demands one unit. The t highest bidders are each given one unit, at the (t + 1) st highest bid. Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) show that the t-unit auction has a unique symmetric equilibrium (albeit under conditions that are stronger than those in our paper) and examine properties of the convergence of the price to the true value of the object. 10 We show that the equilibria in this auction are identical to those in our rationing mechanism. To the extent that bidders bid one price in our model, the framework is different from Wilson (1979) . In the latter, bidders submit demand functions. 11 We assume constant marginal valuation for each fractional amount of one unit, or flat demand curves. Hence, our bidders submit a single price. In a model with three agents, independent signals, and almost common values, Bulow and Klemperer (2001) demonstrate conditions under which rationing is the optimal mechanism for the seller. The precise condition they identify is that the haz- 9 Cremer and McLean (1988) and McAfee, Macmillan and Reny (1989) show that it is possible for sellers to extract full surplus (eliminate underpricing) if bidders' signals are correlated. However, their mechanisms requires that buyers agree ex ante to buy the asset at a price designated by the seller, even if on hearing the price, they might not want to trade. This mechanism therefore violates ex post rationality, and bears little resemblance to real-world institutions. 10 Kremer (2000a) also considers this convergence. 11 Other papers that consider models in which bidders submit demand (or supply) functions include Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , Kyle (1989) , Back and Zender (1993) , and Kremer (2000b) .
ard rate of signals must be decreasing. Under this condition, the optimal mechanism involves the seller posting a price, at which all three buyers are willing to buy the good. While this condition is violated in our example with a uniform distribution in Section 4, Bulow and Klemperer offer an intuition for our results in terms of a game they introduce called the "Maximum Game." We comment on this in greater detail in Section 4.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our general model. Section 3 examines some properties of bid and revenue functions in the general case. Section 4 discusses a special case of the signal distribution that proves more tractable and allows for explicit revenue comparisons, and is followed by some concluding remarks, in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Model
We model the bidding behavior of informed investors in an IPO. The seller wishes to sell k shares to n > k investors, each of whom demands one share. Following Benveniste and Busaba (1996) and Sherman (2001) , we model the bookbuilding mechanism as a generalization of a multi-unit common value auction. In practice, of course there are many distinctive features of bookbuilding, including information sharing and gathering.
12 However, once bids have been entered in the book, they are essentially firm. 13 We thus view them as sealed bids.
In the bookbuilding mechanism, the seller announces a rationing rule, which has two components. First, the seller chooses a t, where k ≤ t < n. He promises that the IPO offer price will be equal to the (t+1) st highest bid. If t > k, he further announces an allocation rule, to divide the shares across the t highest bidders. An investor then receives a private signal about the value of the asset, and submits a bid for one share. Finally, based on the book which only he observes, the seller announces an offer price and the k shares are allocated to investors. Investors' bids (i.e., the details of the book) are confidential throughout, and are not released even after the IPO. Thus, the output of the bookbuilding mechanism is an offer price and a set of allocations to investors. When t = k, each of the highest k bidders is allocated one share. This effectively represents market-clearing. That is, there is no rationing, and the allocation received by the winning bidders is 100% of what they requested. In contrast, for t > k, there is rationing. Each of the t bidders have indicated a willingness to buy the item at strictly greater than the offer price. Hence, in the aggregate, potential winners must be rationed, to a degree 1 −
Definition 1 Consider some integer t ≥ k. In a (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism, the offer price is set to the (t+1) st highest bid. Each bidder who receives a positive allocation pays this price. Further, the k shares are allocated amongst the t highest bidders.
No bidder receives more than her demand (i.e., one share), and, conditional on being amongst the t highest bidders, the allocation received by an agent is independent of her bid.
Many allocation rules are consistent with this definition, including: (i) pro rata rationing: each investor in the set of potential winners receives k t shares, (ii) random allocation: the seller randomly chooses k of the t potential winners; each of these k bidders receives their full demand (one share), and the others receive nothing. (iii) discretionary allocation: the seller wishes to reward a set of long-term customers, investor 1 through i. These customers (preferred investors) receive their full quota (i.e., one share) if they are in the set of potential winners, and nothing otherwise. Other winners (regular investors) have their allocations reduced accordingly, either in pro rata or random fashion.
The shares have a common value to all investors, V , which is drawn from an atomless distribution,
V represents the long-term value of the asset. 14 We emphasize that we do not expect V to be represented by the price at the end of the first day (or the first week) of trading in the secondary market.
Investors have private information about the long-term value of the asset. The information of investor i is represented by a signal, S i . The signals of different investors are conditionally independent (given V ), but all depend on V in the following manner. Each S i , for i = 1, . . . , n, is independently drawn from the same atomless distribution
Here, represents dispersion of opinion about the value of the asset. We assume that v h − v > 2 , so that informed investors' beliefs are more precise than the prior over V .
Hence, given V , the height of the conditional signal distribution at any signal, s, depends only on the position of the signal, relative to the lowest possible value (v − ). Therefore, a higher value of v leads to a shift in the support of the signal distribution, but the distribution has the same shape, given the support.
Formally,
Part (ii) of the assumption further implies that g(s
is a variant of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property.
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Note that, in our model, is independent of V . Intuitively, this means that the dispersion of investors' opinions over value does not depend on whether V is high or low. That is, does not depend on the long-term per share price of the asset. Empirically, can be inferred from the range of analyst forecasts over the value of the asset. 16 We consider one-shot equilibria of the bookbuilding game. In practice, the set of bidders in an IPO varies from issue to issue. For example, in the 39 issues that Cornelli and Goldreich (2001a) analyze, only 16.8% bid in at least 10 issues. There are, therefore, several bidders who rarely participate in more than one deal. These players will perforce bid as if in the one-shot game. Further, amongst the long-term players, absent explicit collusion, there may not be knowledge of which bidders are participating in which transaction. Since long-term bidders also pick and choose transactions, the usual punishments seen in repeated games are difficult to enforce. Hence, we consider equilibria of the one-shot game amongst investors, and ignore repeated game effects in bidding.
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) provide an optimal mechanism for IPOs when investors' signals are independent. Since we have correlated signals, their mechanism does not apply. The optimal mechanism with our signal structure is exhibited by McAfee, MacMillan, and Reny (1989), who demonstrate that it is possible for the seller to extract the full surplus from buyers. Their mechanism includes a strong individual rationality constraint on the buyers. A seller must have the ability to potentially inflict large punishments on the buyers. Such mechanisms are not observed in practice, partly because the seller's ability to penalize the buyers is limited.
Equilibrium in the Bookbuilding Mechanism
Given an allocation rule, a bidder observes her own signal s, and chooses a bid. We consider a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, in which all bidders choose the same bid function, and a bidder with signal s bids b(s). It is natural to consider equilibria in which b(·) is strictly increasing in s; that is, bidders with higher signals submit higher bids.
Let Y j,n be a random variable representing the j th highest order statistic of bidders' signals, where n signals are drawn. Hence, Y j,n ≥ Y j+1,n for all j = 1, . . . , n − 1. We first show that the equilibrium bids (and, by implication, seller revenue) do not depend on the particular allocation rule used, provided it satisfies the property that the allocations are independent of the actual bids of agents who bid more than the offer price. The intuition is that, conditional on being amongst the t highest bids, the allocation rule exposes each agent to a lottery. If the agent does not have one of the t highest bids, she gets zero allocation, with no access to the lottery. As long as the probability of receiving an allocation in the lottery is independent of the bids of any agent in the set of potential winners, the behavior of a risk-neutral agent will be unaffected.
Proposition 1 Consider any two allocation rules within a (k, t)−bookbuilding mech-
anism. These rules result in the same set of equilibria.
Proposition 1 implies that all allocation rules allowed for by the mechanism are equivalent (in terms of bids and revenues) to the pro rata rationing rule with no discretionary allocation, though each of these implies a very different set of final allocations. Thus, if a seller allocates shares in a way that benefits clients with whom he has a long term relationship, this is not to the detriment of the issuer.
Within this class of allocation rules, there are several advantages to pro rata rationing, in particular. Many exchanges have requirements on the distribution of shares across investors. 17 Thus, one of the goals of an IPO must be to generate a dispersed shareholder base. It has also been suggested that share dispersion per se increases the value of a firm. 18 In addition, Brennan and Franks (1996) argue that rationing is used because current owners want to reduce the block size of new shareholders. Markets which exhibit pro rata rationing, include Singapore (Koh and Walter, 1989), Israel (Amihud, Hauser and Kirsh, 2002) , and the UK (Levis, 1990 ). Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) describe the allocation methods used in the UK, Germany, France and the US. In Germany, the June 7, 2000, guidelines promulgated by the Federal Ministry of Finance tries to rule out "subjective" criteria for allocating shares to retail investors. It recommends that issuers draw lots, allocate pro rata either within certain order sizes or across the whole offer, or allocate according to time priority or some other "objective" criteria. One of the mechanisms adopted in France, the offrè a prix ferme, has pro rata allocations at a fixed price. Further, the current legal troubles of Salomon, Smith Barney over preferential allocation of shares in IPOs 19 would appear to enhance the appeal of pro rata rationing, with no discretionary allocation, in the US. Now, suppose t = k. In this case, each of the t highest bidders gets her full demand (one unit). The bookbuilding mechanism is then equivalent to a common value auction with t units in which each bidder demands one unit, and winning bidders all pay the (t + 1) st highest price. This auction was first analyzed by Milgrom (1981) .
We refer to this as the t−unit auction. We show that the set of equilibria when the seller has k shares for sale, and rations across t > k investors, is identical to the corresponding set when the seller actually sells t shares with no rationing. For a fixed t, in either of these mechanisms, a winning bidder has the same information: she knows she has one of the t highest signals. Hence, her bids in the two mechanisms are the same.
The symmetric equilibrium of the t-unit common-value auction was characterized by Milgrom (1981) . Without loss of generality, consider the behavior of bidder 1. As Milgrom (1981) shows, bidder 1, with signal s, bids as if her signal is equal to the t th highest (or pivotal) signal amongst the remaining (n − 1) bidders. This is the price at which she is indifferent between winning and losing the asset. In a symmetric equilibrium, all bidders choose this strategy.
Proposition 2 For a (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism, (i) the set of equilibria is equivalent to the set of equilibria in the t−unit auction. (ii) there is a symmetric equilibrium in which a bidder with signal s chooses a bidding function
First, we show that for a fixed k, the bid function, b(s; t) is strictly increasing in t. 20 Since t is directly related to the degree of rationing (which is 1 − k t ), the bid function therefore increases with rationing. Intuitively, a higher value of t implies that a bidder may win the object even if he did not receive the highest signal. Thus, the "winner's curse" is mitigated: conditional on winning, a bidder in the (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism knows only that her signal was among the t highest. Hence, the greater the degree of rationing in the mechanism, the more aggressive each bidder is. The implications of this are that there is a benefit to the seller from rationing: bidders bid more aggressively. There is, of course, the obvious cost of choosing a lower ranked bid to set the offer price. We show later that, under some conditions, the seller can increase her revenue by rationing.
Therefore, even when the number of shares being sold is held fixed, the equilibrium bids contained in the book will vary with the seller's commitment to rationing. Thus, inferences drawn from the book must condition on the degree of rationing.
What can we infer from realized bids (i.e., the book)? We show that, for low t, bidders shade their bids, in the sense of bidding less than the conditional value of the asset, given their signal. However, for high t, they increment their bids, by bidding more than this conditional asset value. This effect, therefore, must be taken into account in inferring bidders' beliefs on the conditional value of the asset from an observed book.
Proposition 4 Consider the (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism. For all s ∈ (v − , v h + ), there exists at(s) such that, for t ≤t(s), b(s; t) ≤ E(V | s), and for t >t(s), b(s; t) > E(V | s).
In Section 4, in a parametric model, we characterize the dispersion of bids submitted to the book and the dispersion of bids that receive positive allocations, and tie these to the degree of rationing.
Bid and Revenue Functions with Uniform Prior

Bids
To characterize the bid function further, we assume for the rest of the paper that F (·), the prior over V , is uniform over [v , v h We first show that, for interior signals, bids are linear in signal. In particular, the bid function can be written as the signal plus an adjustment term that compensates for the size of the winner's curse. This adjustment term is increasing in the number of investors, n, but decreasing in the degree of rationing. 2δ(n, t) ), where δ is increasing n, decreasing in t, and is independent of s and .
In other words, regardless of the shape of G(·), the bid function over interior signals is linear, and takes the form of the signal plus a constant (which may be positive or negative). Further, a change in t leads to a parallel shift of the bid function. Since this holds regardless of the shape of G(· | v), this considerably simplifies the revenue function when all signals lie in this range.
The term representing the winner's curse adjustment, δ(·), may be greater or less than for small values of t, and less than 1 2 for large values of t. Hence, when t is low, bidders bid less than their signal, and, when t is high, they bid more than their signal.
For signal ranges in the corners, s ∈ [v − , v + ) and s ∈ (v h − , v h + ], the bid function is non-linear. It is still decreasing in n and increasing in t, but depends on signal as well.
Revenue
We next examine the effect of rationing on revenue. As the degree of rationing increases, the seller is awarding the good at the bid of a bidder with a lower signal. Thus, the seller trades off the increase in the bid function against the fact that he is awarding it to a lower order statistic.
To illustrate this, we first characterize the revenue of the seller. Let R(v; t) denote the seller's expected revenue in the (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism, conditional on the event V = v. In the (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism, the seller earns the expected (t + 1) th highest bid, with n signal draws. That is,
The seller in our model is uninformed, and earns an ex ante revenue ofR(t) = v h v R(v; t)dv in the (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism. The seller's goal in our model is to choose an optimal t; i.e., the t that maximizesR(t). Market-clearing corresponds to choosing t = 1, whereas higher values of t imply rationing.
A necessary condition for seller revenue,R(t), to increase in t (over any range of t) is that R(v; t) be increasing in t for some t and some v. Hence, we focus initially on R(v; t).
When signals are in the interior, the bid function is linear in s.
, all signals will be interior. Hence, it follows immediately that the revenue function is linear in v over this range. In particular, the revenue function can be written in terms of δ(n, t).
As proposition 5 shows, we can define δ(n, t) as follows. highest of an independent sample of n draws from Z. Then, δ(n, t) is defined as E(S |S = Z t,n−1 ). Now, the revenue function can be written in terms of δ(n, t) and Z t+1,n , the (t+1) st highest order statistic from a sample of n draws of x.
Proposition 6 Consider the (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism, and an interior value of
This form of the revenue function illustrates the tradeoff for the seller. For each value of V in the relevant range, increasing t leads to a lower winner's curse, and hence a lower last term in the expression for R(v; t). As mentioned before, this term proxies for the extent of the winner's curse. However, it also leads to a reduced order statistic being used to set the price of the item, which is captured by the E(Z t+1,n ) term.
The linear revenue function allows us to determine when rationing increases revenue. Indeed, the seller compares the increase in revenue (in going from a (k, t)-to a (k,t)-bookbuilding mechanism) obtained as a result of the increase in the bid functions to the decrease in revenue as a result of choosing the (t + 1) st bid to set the price of the item, rather than the (t + 1) st one. The left-hand side of equation 1 below is the increase in revenue and the right-hand side is the decrease.
Corollary 6.1 Consider an interior value of v, so that v ∈ [v + 2 , v h − 2 ]. Then, for any t,t = 1, . . . , n − 1, R(v;t) > R(v; t) if and only if δ(n, t) − δ(n,t) > E[Z
Hence, when
the comparison of R(v; t) and R(v;t) is independent of the actual value of V in this range. That is, if (1) holds for some t,t, then
R(v;t) > R(v; t) for all
. This condition is easy to check for any distribution.
While (1) is a necessary condition for higher degrees of rationing to yield higher revenue, clearly there are values of (given v and v h ) such that it is also a sufficient condition. In particular, if (1) holds and is small relative to v h − v , then ex ante revenue must be increasing in the degree of rationing.
Suppose (1) holds for some distribution G and somet > k, so that R(v;t) > R(v; t) for all
V ∈ [v + 2 , v h − 2 ]. In the corner regions, V ∈ [v , v + 2 ), and V ∈ (v h − 2 , v h ],
we may have R(v;t) < R(v; t) over some range. However, the difference, R(v; t) − R(v;t) is bounded. Hence, it follows that, if is small enough relative to (v h −v ), thenR(t) >R(t).
In other words, if the signal is relatively precise, relative to the prior over V , seller's ex ante revenue increases when the higher degree of rationing,t, is chosen. In the next section, we demonstrate that R(v; t) is increasing in t for interior values of v when the signal distribution is diffuse enough.
Parametric Signal Distribution
From the tradeoff explored in the previous section, it is clear that the specific choice of t depends on the signal distribution. To explore this further, and to provide some economic intuition on this tradeoff, we consider a class of signal distributions that has the uniform as a special case. We determine the bid and revenue functions, and numerically solve for the optimal t, given a signal distribution. We then provide comparative statics on the book, and show how allocations change with the exogenous variables in our model. This allows us to compute endogenous bid ranges, which generates empirical predictions.
We assume that the signal distribution is uniform, with an extra parameter that allows for strict convexity of the distribution function. Observe that, when c is large and t is low, there is potentially a large winner's curse. Consider, for example, the case of c = 2 and t = 1. If a bidder wins, since the distribution function is steep at high s, her signal is likely to be further away from other bidder's signals than if c were, say, 1. Hence, for low values of t, bidders should shade their bids (relative to their signals) more for higher values of c. When t is high, the reverse logic holds: there is a probability that some bidders have higher signals, and, when the distribution function is steep, other bidder's signals can be significantly higher than that of the winning bidder. This intuition will be reflected in the equilibrium bid functions.
Recall that signals in the range [v + , v h − ] are interior signals. We first derive the bid function for such signals.
Proposition 7 Suppose s ∈ [v + , v h − ]. In the (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism, the equilibrium bid function is
Since we have a closed form expression for the bid function, we provide the corresponding expression for signals in the corners. Define
. Goldreich (2001a; Table III , page 2349) document that, in their data, (i) there are an average of 38.9 limit bids and 9.1 step bids 21 per issue, (ii) the average rationing across limit and step bids is approximately 50% (Table III) , (iii) 21.5% of limit bids and 9.8% of step bids are allocated no shares, since the prices are below the offer price (page 2343) and (iv) the mean IPO offer price is $23.6 (Table I) . For our numeric example, therefore, we assume n = 50. Consider the effects of pro rata rationing. Since approximately 20% of all bidders get no shares, and the rationing is about 50%, we use t = 40 and k = The vertical difference between the two functions represents the difference in the winner's curse adjustment between the two levels of t. 21 These are the two kinds of bids that are price-contingent in their study. While it is immediate that b(s; t) is increasing in t, the extent of the increase depends on c. For c = 1, increasing t has a large effect on bids. As c gets large, changing t has a smaller effect on bid functions. The t that we expect to observe in IPO deals is the t that maximizes seller revenue.
Lemma 1 Suppose s ∈ [v − , v + ]. Then, the equilibrium bid function is b(s; t)
We analyze the effects of changing the degree of rationing on the revenue of the seller. We start with the revenue for a given value of v and t, R(v; t). Analytically, we restrict attention to interior values of v. We first determine the revenue function in this range, and then derive a condition under which R(v; t + 1) > R(v; t) (that is, rationing yields higher revenue than market-clearing). Subsequently, we examine both R(v; t) and the ex ante revenue,R(t) = v h v R(v; t)dv in the context of our numeric example.
Proposition 8 Suppose v is in the interior; that is,
v ∈ [v + 2 , v h − 2 ]. Then, in equilibrium, (i) R(v; t) = v − 2 t−1 j=0 n−j− 1 c n−j − t j=0 n−j (n−j+ 1 c ) (ii) R(v; t + 1
) > R(v; t) if and only if
When G(· | v) is uniform, the bid and revenue functions simplify considerably. As shown by Harstad and Bordley (1996) , the bid function for interior signals reduces to a function of the ratio t n , and the revenue function for interior values of v is clearly increasing in t.
Proposition 9
Suppose c = 1; that is, the signal distribution is uniform. Then, in
That, is the revenue unambiguously increases as the degree of rationing increases. Therefore, in this case, the optimal t in class of (k, t)−bookbuilding mechanisms is t = (n − 1). That is, the seller should choose maximal rationing when c = 1.
Note that the above comparison of revenues for different t assumes a given v in the interior of possible values; that is, v ∈ [v + 2 , v h − 2 ]. As argued before, if rationing leads to higher revenue for all v in this region, and if is small relative to (v h − v ), this implies that ex ante revenueR(t) is also higher for the seller with rationing.
Next, we consider the effects of rationing when V is in the corners; that is, V < v + or V > v h − . For v in this range, there is positive probability that the signals will lie outside the interior segment, so that the linear bid function no longer applies. In this case, an analytical examination of the change in revenue due to rationing is difficult. Instead, we numerically evaluate the effects of rationing. Figure 3 below provides the difference in revenues, in going from t = 20 to t = 40 for all values of v (including the corners) in our numeric example.
Note that, as v approaches v , rationing loses its luster, and leads to lower revenue. From the seller's point of view, the benefit to rationing is that, by mitigating the winners' curse, it induces bidders to bid more aggressively. This effect is at its strongest when a bidder's posterior over v is diffuse, given his own signal. In our context, since the prior over v is diffuse, a diffuse signal distribution translates to a diffuse posterior over v. In general, as v approaches v or v h , the posterior becomes more concentrated (at least, its support shrinks in size), potentially reducing the benefits of rationing.
Given a value of c, the seller chooses an optimal degree of rationing to maximize ex ante revenueR(t) = As c increases, the optimal level of rationing decreases, 22 and when c is large, market-
We first demonstrate analytically, for interior values of v, that market-clearing is optimal when c becomes large enough.
Proposition 10 For
, there exists ac > 1 such that, for c ≥c,
market-clearing is preferable to rationing.
Since analytic results on the corners are difficult to obtain, we use our numeric example to compute the optimal allocation proportion when the seller maximizes ex ante revenue, Figure 4 demonstrates the results. This suggests that the oversubscription in IPOs of firms in new industries (where investor beliefs are diffuse) should be high. Bulow and Klemperer (2001) offer an intuition for this result in terms of the "Maximum Game," a game in which the common consumption value to all agents depends only on the maximum of all signals.
23 If the signal distribution is uniform, the signal range (the maximum minus the minimum signal) is a sufficient statistic for all other properties of the distribution, including the mean, which, in our parametric model, is the expected consumption value given all signals. Selling to the lowest signal bidder is not optimal, and eliminating this bidder recovers the intuition of the Maximum Game. In our model, as c approaches 1 from above, the model more closely resembles a Maximum Game, and hence maximal rationing is optimal.
Armed with an optimal t for each c, we can determine the endogenous distribution of bids in the book. In particular, we can compute the maximum and minimum bids (and hence the range), and the offer price (and thus the range of bids that received a positive allocation). This leads to some empirical predictions linking the degree of rationing with observed properties of bids.
We emphasize that these comparative statics predictions assume all else held constant; in particular, , n, k, and [v , v h ]. The optimal value of t is endogenously determined given these parameters and c.
Observation # 1: The range of submitted bids on the book is smaller if the degree of rationing is smaller. The range of bids received (the maximum bid minus the minimum bid) declines with c. 24 Hence, this range should be directly related to the degree of rationing; i.e., inversely related to the allocation percentage across IPO deals. Observation # 2: The range of bids above the offer price is smaller if the degree of rationing is smaller. The observed range of bids that receive a positive allocation (i.e., the maximum bid minus the offer price) also declines with c (since t declines with c). Hence, this range should also be positively related to the degree of rationing (or alternatively, inversely related to the aggregate allocation percentage).
Under what circumstances would we expect c to change in a predictable manner? Consider a sequence of IPOs of firms in the same industry. One would expect information on the first firm to be diffuse. Since information about other firms is likely to be correlated, as more firms go public, information should become more precise. 25 Thus, we would expect c to increase with each subsequent IPO.
The same comparative static holds when comparing IPOs to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). If a firm has been publicly traded for a length of time, information about it is more precise, and hence c should be larger. Indeed, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001b) find some support for this view. They find that, in their sample, the average elasticity of demand for SEOs is much larger than the average elasticity of demand for IPOs. This average elasticity measures the proportion of bids within 1% of the offer price, and hence proxies for the precision in the information of bidders.
Given a book with many price-contingent bids for a single IPO deal, the parameters c and can be structurally estimated. From this, signals can then be inferred from bids, and hence a more accurate measure of the true value of the asset (which depends on all signals) can be generated.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a model of rationing in IPOs. We demonstrate that the bids of the agents depend on the rationing rule: higher rationing mitigates the winner's curse, and leads to higher bids. This effect is beneficial to the seller; the cost of the rationing is that the bidder who sets the price has a lower signal.
We consider the case of a uniform prior over true value, and show that rationing leads to higher revenue than market-clearing when the signal distribution is diffuse enough. In other words, when an agent's posterior over V , conditional on his signal, is diffuse, there is a large winner's curse. In such cases, mitigating the winner's curse has a relatively significant impact on bids, and outweighs the effect of choosing a lower order bid to set the price. Conversely, when agents' signals are precise, the latter effect dominates, and increasing the degree of rationing leads to lower revenue. 25 Alti (2002) suggests that such an information structure should be a feature of observed IPOs.
This effect is in contrast to the earlier literature on rationing and the winner's curse, such as Rock (1986) and Benveniste and Spindt (1989) . In this earlier work, rationing embodies the winner's curse, and hurts seller revenue. In our model, even within a one-shot game, rationing can be revenue-enhancing.
Our model allows realized allocations to vary widely across the set of winning bidders. Indeed, our results depend only on the aggregate rationing level chosen by the issuer, not on individual rationing across investors. This is also in contrast to Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , whose model implies that investors with high bids should have their demands filled before investors with low bids receive any shares. The empirical literature suggests that departures from this latter paradigm are common (see, for example Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001a) .
Rationing affects the allocation of the good in the primary market. In a pure common value case, which we consider, it should have no effect on the secondary market (in fact, there should be no trade in the secondary market, by the Milgrom and Stokey, 1982, no-trade theorem). However, if the value of the asset to an agent includes a private component, the allocation in the primary market will, in general, affect volume and value in the secondary market. Such a model is an avenue for further research.
Appendix: Proofs Proof of Proposition 1
Let ν i define an allocation rule faced by agent i, conditional on i having one of the t highest bids (that is, being in the set of potential winners). ν i can be a function of any variable observed by the seller (including, for example, the identity of agent i or some other agent j), except the bid of any agent.
Formally, ν i is a probability distribution over [0, 1], where 0 is the minimum number of shares agent i can receive, and 1 (her demand) the maximum. The allocation rule has the property that agent i faces the probability distribution ν i if her bid is among the t highest bids, and receives 0 shares otherwise.
Consider agent i's payoff when she is in the set of winners. Since all allocations pay the (t + 1) st highest bid, this payoff is represented as
The expectation of V is with respect to the agent's posterior distribution over V . Applying Fubini's theorem to interchange the two expectations, and noting that ν i is independent of all bids, this expected payoff can be written as
whereν i is the mean of ν i . Now,ν i is a constant unaffected by agent i's signal, her bid, or the bids of any other agent. Hence, if all agents have the same bidding strategies across the two rationing rules, the optimal strategy of agent i too must be the same. Therefore, if the bidding functions {b i (·)} n i=1 constitute an equilibrium under one rationing rule, they must also comprise an equilibrium under any other rationing rule that satisfies Definition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Consider the decision faced by agent 1 in the (k, t)-bookbuilding mechanism. Let b 2 , . . . , b n denote the bids of the other (n−1) agents, in decreasing order. Then, agent 1 chooses a bid b 1 that maximizes
whereν 1 is the rationing rule faced by her, conditional on being among the t highest bidders.
Next, consider a t-unit auction. In this auction, bidder 1 chooses a bidb 1 to maximize
That is, the payoffs differ only by a multiplicative constant,ν i . This term is independent of any signals or bids. Clearly, the set of maximizers is the same in either case. Hence, the best response correspondences of the two mechanisms are identical, as are their equilibria.
(ii) Milgrom (1981) demonstrates that the t-unit auction has a symmetric equilibrium
We 
. By inspection, δ is independent of s and . Now, note that δ(n, t) may be written as E[S |S = X t,n−1 ], whereS has distribution H, and X t,n−1 is the t th highest signal from an independent sample of n − 1 variables each with distribution H. Hence, δ is decreasing in t, and increasing in n.
Proof of Proposition 6
When Proof of Corollary 6.1
Immediate.
Proof of Proposition 7
The following two integration facts are used in this proof and the next two ones. Let α, β be real-valued, with α > −1, and γ > 0 be an integer. Then, repeated integration by parts yields 
where A in equation (3) 
Consider the denominator first. We have ,
where the second equality applies equation (4) , and the last step follows from For market-clearing to be optimal, this inequality must hold for all t ≥ k. Consider c → ∞. In the limit, the condition reduces to n−t−1 n−t < 1, which clearly holds for all t ≥ k. Since both sides of the inequality are continuous in c, it follows that there exists ac such that the condition holds for all t ≥ k and all c ≥c. Finally, since maximal rationing is optimal at c = 1, it must be thatc > 1.
